Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq

The purpose of this study is to shed further light on various aspects of an issue which attracts the attention of several observers of Middle Eastern affairs: The waters of Euphrates and Tigris. Several books and innumerable articles were written on this issue, but most of them reflected the views of the downstream riparians of these two rivers, namely Syria and Iraq.

Turkey's views were reflected in those books and articles either in a patchy or distorted manner or were not reflected at all. But the authors of those books and articles cannot be blamed for this. A text containing the official position of Turkey on this issue was not made available to possible users.

This study does not claim to reflect all aspects of Turkey's position, but is a compilation of Turkey's views on various aspects of the question. The issue of waters of Euphrates and Tigris deserves several in-depth studies on each of these aspects, because these two rivers have their own characteristics which differ from many transboundary rivers in other regions of the world: they stem from a country (Turkey) which is poor in water resources and they flow into the territories of two states one of which (Syria) is even poorer and the other (Iraq) is richer than Turkey in water resources.

Furthermore lack of mutual trust among countries of the region create additional difficulties in the search for solution to the problems.

This study may contribute to filling the gap stemming from the lack of information regarding Turkey's position on this important issue.

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A. The general situation

The water problem has come in the recent years to the forefront in the relations among the countries of the Middle East. It also occupies an important place in the agenda of several international organizations. Main characteristics of the problem may be highlighted as follows.

Current water resources in the Middle East have become insufficient to meet the needs.
The scarcity of water will continue to increase in future as the population grows and consumption per head of inhabitant augments.
As a result, water is likely to become the cause of conflict among the countries of the region.
The keen interest and sensitivity of Arab countries on water issues stem from the fact that almost all the Arab countries are downstream riparians and they lack in water resources. Therefore there is a natural convergence of interest among them to obtain more extensive rights for the downstream countries wherever they may be.

As to Israel, another Middle Eastern country which has problems connected with water, the question has many facets: It is pointed out by international water experts that the Occupied Territories especially the Golan Heights and the West Bank are of vital importance for Israel if they are considered from the water resources point of view. This assessment of international experts is confirmed by Israeli officials. Israel controls the tributaries of the Jordan River and utilizes the waters of this river at a maximum level. In the occupied West Bank, underground water resources are vastly utilized by Israel. 40 per cent of the annual water requirement of Israel is supplied by these underground water resources (1). Within this framework, majority of all the water resources which Israel is using today come from the adjacent Arab territories under the Israeli occupation. If Israel loses its control on these territories during the process of the Middle-East Peace Negotiations, this might lead to serious deprivation of water resources for Israel (2). Although Israeli officials say that they may make some territorial concessions to the surrounding Arab countries, they openly state that the above mentioned water resources are indispensable for Israel (3). Water, in this context, is becoming a determining factor for the establishment of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

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B. Turkey's Position Relating to the Water Resources

It will be appropriate to underline at the outset that Turkey, contrary to the prevailing belief, is not a country rich in water resources. Furthermore it is not the richest country of the region in water resources.

Turkey is not a country which has excess water capacity. Although Turkey has at present more water resources than some of its neighbours, it can be regarded as a country which will find itself in a position not to meet its own needs in the near future. Turkey's average annual runoff is about 186 billion cubic meters (Bm3). The amount available for consumption of this capacity is mere 110 Bm3, including 12 Bm3 of groundwater. Taking into consideration that Turkey's population is 60 million, the quantity of water per capita will be 1 830 cubic meters (m3) (4). Countries regarded as rich in water resources, have 8-10 thousand m3 water per capita per year. In other words, the available water per capita in Turkey is about one-fifth of the water-rich countries. The impression of Turkey having excess water derives from the fact that it is not at present in a position to fully utilize its water resources. Today Turkey utilizes only 25.9 Bm3 of its capacity of 110 Bm3 (5). The remaining portion of 84.1 Bm3 is not what Turkey is not in need of, but an amount which cannot yet be allocated to its needs.

In some international publications, the available water per capita per year in Iraq and Syria are indicated as 5 192 m3 and 2 362 m3 respectively (6). These figures are probably calculated taking into account the total water potential of those countries, whereas the per capita water figures available for consumption in water-rich and some Middle Eastern countries are given in Table 1.

As can be seen in Table 1, the per capita per annum water figure for Iraq is higher than that of Turkey. That figure for Syria is also not so much less than that of Turkey. These figures indicate that Turkey does not have abundant water resources to be allocated to meet the needs of the other Middle Eastern countries.

Turkey's position reflecting the exact situations on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers is explained in the following paragraphs.

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C. Water Disputes in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin

a) The Euphrates River
Originating from Turkey and flowing through Syria and Iraq, the Euphrates River joins the Tigris in Iraq and becomes the Shatt-al Arab waterway which falls into the Persian Gulf. The Euphrates River is composed of two main tributaries, namely, the Karasu and the Murat rivers, both originating in the Eastern Anatolia and of numerous smaller tributaries.

The total water potential of the Euphrates Basin and the consumption figures estimated by each of the three riparian countries, in respect of the projects which they plan to develop, are shown in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates that, while 88,7 per cent of the total water potential of the Euphrates Basin originates in Turkey, Syria contributes only an amount of 11,3 %. Iraq's contribution to the runoffs is nil. While the contribution of these two downstream countries to the water potential of the Euphrates is such a modest percentage, they have been demanding 22 % and 43 % respectively out of this potential. Turkey envisages to utilize only 35 % of the total consumption target, while providing 88,7 % of the total flow.

Another point in Table 2, which is worth underlining, is that the total amount of water planned to be utilized by the three riparian countries exceeds by 17.3 Bm3 the total flow capacity of the Euphrates. Obviously, it is impossible to meet such a demand as far as this river's potential is concerned.

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b) The Tigris River
The Tigris River, originating from the Lake Hazar becomes the border between Turkey and Syria for a distance of 40 kilometers (km). After crossing the Iraqi territory and joining the Euphrates to form Shatt-el-Arab waterway in Iraq, the Tigris River pours into the Persian Gulf. Its main tributaries are Botan, Batmansu, Karpansu and the Greater Zap rivers.

If Table 2 is remodeled for the Tigris Basin, we obtain Table 3.

As can be seen in Table 3, the total water potential of the basin is shared by Turkey and Iraq. Their contributions are 51,9 % and 48,1 % respectively. As in the case of the Euphrates Basin, the consumption targets put forward by Syria and Iraq are also much higher than the water potential originated in their lands. Turkey, on the other hand, envisages to utilize relatively a small portion of the waters coming out in its own territory. As is the case with Euphrates Basin, the amount of water, planned to be used by three riparian countries of Tigris River exceeds the total capacity of this river by an amount of 5,8 Bm3.

It would be appropriate to point out another important fact relating to the Tigris River. Due to the fact that virtually Turkey does not utilize at all the water of Tigris, Iraq alone has been utilizing the entire annual capacity of 48 Bm3 of this river. When a transfer of water is proposed by Turkey from the Tigris to the Euphrates with a view to alleviating the water shortage of the latter, Iraq rejected this proposal. This cannot be regarded as "equitable utilization". In fact many scholars and water experts see the solution to the insufficiency of the Euphrates water by transferring part of the Tigris flows to the former (10). The widely shared view is that, if such a transfer is carried out, then all irrigation projects planned on the Euphrates by three riparian countries can be implemented. This is an additional indication that the water problem around Euphrates is artificial. In other words, there is a reasonable way of overcoming the difficulties stemming from the lack of sufficient water in the Euphrates Basin but some riparian countries block this solution for a reason difficult to explain.

In addition to these facts, there exist different views between the figures given by Syria and Iraq and the findings of international water experts concerning the irrigable lands by the waters of the Euphrates (See Table 4). In the publications pertaining to the irrigation matters, lands are divided into 6 categories. The first three categories of lands are the most efficient which can yield maximum production by way of irrigation. The fourth category of land is of marginal value. Yield can be obtained from the fifth category only with considerable amount of investment. Finally, sixth category lands are of unyielding type and production cannot be obtained even by way of irrigation (11).

While all of the Turkish lands to be irrigated by the Euphrates River are of the first, second and third categories, the similar categories of lands in Syria, represent only 48 % of the agricultural lands which are contemplated to be irrigated with the Euphrates waters (12). Therefore, it will not only be uneconomical but will also be inequitable to utilize scarce water resources to irrigate infertile lands at the expense of fertile lands.

Both Syria and Iraq demand considerable amount of water for their less fertile lands of the Euphrates River Basin where there exists a water scarcity problem. In this situation, there emerges a water requirement in the Euphrates flows which is much higher than the river's average annual flow of 31,58 Bm3. When this matter is brought to the attention of Syria and Iraq, they propose that lacking amount of water be deducted proportionally from each country's demand. Turkey finds it difficult to agree with this approach and points out that the quantity of the water needed for irrigation should be determined by applying identical criteria to all of the three countries, while Syria and Iraq state that each country must be free to choose the criteria it will use to determine its own water needs and these statements should not be questioned by the other riparian States. In a democratic country like Turkey, it would be very difficult for a government to explain to its public such an arbitrary way of determining water needs.

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c) Another Issue of Dispute: The Orontes (Al-Asi) River
Emanating from Lebanon, the Orontes passes through Syria and flows into the Mediterranean Sea within the Turkish province of Hatay (see Map IV). It covers 40 km, 120 km and 88 km in Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, respectively. In Lebanon, there are two water regulators on Orontes, and in Syria there are two dams, namely, Destan and Maherde dams, in addition to a water regulator in the town of Jisr-Al-Sughur. Both countries, especially Syria, have been intensively utilizing this river for irrigation purposes. Syria has been making use of 90 % of the total flow which reaches an annual average of 1,2 Bm3 at the Turkey-Syria border. Out of this total capacity, only a meager amount of 120 million cubic meters (Mm3) enters in Turkey, after it is heavily used by Syria (14). However, this amount will further decrease to the range of 25 Mm3, if the planned reservoirs of Ziezoun and Kastoun in Syria are built in addition to the existing dams on the river. 80 Mm3 of water from the Orontes River has been earmarked for the utilization of Lebanon in accordance with the agreement made between Syria and Lebanon on 20 September 1994.

Many lessons can be drawn from the comparison between the Euphrates and the Orontes rivers in respect of both the water released to the downstream countries and the utilization. While Syria and Iraq accuse Turkey of reducing the amount of water in the Euphrates, in another river, namely the Orontes where Syria is an upstream country, she utilizes almost the whole of the water of the river and releases to Turkey only a meager amount of water.

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d) Objections Directed by Syria and Iraq Towards the Dams Built on the Euphrates River by Turkey
Syria and Iraq have strongly opposed to all water installations that had been planned and implemented on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers by Turkey so far. Their objections centered on the argument that those installations would reduce the quantity of water flowing to their countries. A clear example to such attitudes can be seen in the construction of Keban and Karakaya dams in 1960s and 1970s. They had stated at that time, that the erection of these dams would inflict damage to their countries.

Furthermore, Syria and Iraq have accused Turkey of not notifying them in advance about the planned water installations in conformity with the "Draft Articles of the Proposed Convention on the Non-navigational Use of the Transboundary Watercourses", of International Law Commission (ILC)-, which have not yet attained a binding legal status.

Nevertheless, all necessary data pertaining to Turkey's planned water schemes, have been conveyed to Syria and Iraq during the Joint Technical Committee meetings, held between the three countries. This mechanism, which was foreseen as a forum to discuss regional water matters, was set up with the Protocol of the Joint Economic Committee meetings, held between Turkey and Iraq in 1980. Syria later joined this mechanism in 1983.

The dams so far constructed and the ones to be constructed by Turkey on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, would not only contribute to its own energy and irrigation needs, but also serve to provide regulated water supply to its neighbours. Turkish dams on the Euphrates River have been found efficient by internationally renowned scholars, due to their effective reservoirs, low evaporation losses and their geographical and topographic characteristics (15). The water flow of these rivers fluctuates greatly from one season to another. In summer months the average flow of these rivers ranges between 150-200 cubic meters per second (m3/s). On the other hand, in the spring time it reaches the level of 5000 or more m3/s. This means literally floods of great proportions in the spring months and drought in summer. These big fluctuations have been regulated due to the construction of dams on the Euphrates River and Turkey's neighbours will not feel the effects of a probable drought and will receive regular and stable water flows.

i) Objections Directed Towards the Impounding of the Atatürk Dam
The most important objection directed towards the dams which Turkey built on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers has been made during the initial impounding of the Atatürk dam.

Turkey's decision to interrupt partially the water flow for one month during the impounding period of the Atatürk Dam in January 1990 was interpreted, especially in the Arab circles, as an attitude which deliberately aimed at depriving its neighbours from water and at causing damage to them.

For the impounding of the Atatürk dam all the necessary measures have been taken by Turkey in order not to cause significant harm to the downstream riparians, Syria and Iraq (16). It should also be conceded that this practice is a technical necessity for the construction of any dam. Syria has been timely informed that the river flow would be interrupted for a period of one month, due to technical necessity. Before the impounding period, Turkey released more water than the commitment of 500 m3/s, which is undertaken by Turkey in accordance with the provisions of a Protocol, signed in 1987 with Syria. Turkey has thus created an opportunity for the downstream countries to accumulate this additional water in their own reservoirs. In this context 768 m3/s of flow has been released at the Turkey-Syria border within the period starting on 23 November 1989 and ending at the beginning of the impounding process on 13 January 1990. Water coming from the tributaries which join the Euphrates between the Atatürk Dam and the Turkish-Syrian border has also continued to flow into Syria in the slice of time between 13 January and 12 February 1990, covering the impounding period. Thus, the total water amount crossing the border between 23 November 1989 and 12 February 1990 has amounted to 3.6 Bm3, corresponding to an average value of 509 m3/s. Therefore, even in this period of 82 days -which also covers the one month impounding period- Syria has received more water than the committed quantity of 500 m3/s. Table 5 shows more clearly of what has been explained above.

Water in the Atatürk Dam has reached the level of 15 Bm3 during the January 1990-September 1991 period. In the same period 27 Bm3 of water has been released to the downstream riparian countries on the basis of 500 m3/s. As these figures indicate, Turkey could have long before concluded the filling of the dam, if it had completely cut water flow to its southern neighbours. Not opting for such a course of action is a proof of Turkey's good intentions and of its sensitivity not to cause damage to its neighbours.

ii) Objections to the Construction of the Birecik Dam
Several objections were also directed to the Birecik Dam, envisaged to be built in the framework of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym GAP).

Turkey's southern neighbours, Syria and Iraq, have objected to the construction of this dam with the pretext that it will harm and reduce their water supply. Iraqi Embassy in Ankara gave a note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 March 1993 and Syria also handed over on 18th July a note to this effect to the Turkish Embassy in Damascus. The reason for the construction of the Birecik Dam is as follows:

3 607 000 000
------------------- = 43 457 831 m3 (flow per day)
82

24 x 60 x 60 = 86 400s (number of seconds per day)

43 457 831
----------------- = 509.12 m3/s (average discharge)
86 400

The water of the Euphrates River is regulated by means of big reservoirs of the Keban and the Atatürk Dams. However, the waters, released from the hydroelectric power plants (HEPP) of those dams, also need to be regulated, especially during the times when the water flow is at its peak, so that the ecology of the downstream areas of the watercourse can be protected. Those dams, constructed for the purpose of harnessing the waters released from large-scale dams and HEPPs, are called after-bay (regulation) dams. The Birecik Dam, in conformity with the above mentioned purpose, is designed to regulate the waters released from the Atatürk Dam and its HEPP and transfer to downstream. The Al-Ba'ath Dam located just at the downstream of the Tabqa Dam in Syria, the Badush Dam situated downstream the Saddam Dam and the Baghdadi Dam positioned immediately after the Qadissiya Dam are all similarly after-bay dams.

During the periods of low demand for power, only one of 8 units of the HEPP of the Atatürk Dam will be operated while during the periods of high demand, all the 8 units will be operated. Hence, the amount of water to be released from the HEPP might vary between 200 m3/s and 2 000 m3/s in one day depending upon the energy demand and the state of the interconnected system.

It has been planned to regulate this fluctuation in the quantity of water for the purpose of a more regular supply of water to downstream countries. The construction of the Birecik Dam will serve the interests of the downstream countries as much as it will serve Turkey's interests.

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Recent Negotiations Concerning the Euphrates-Tigris Basin between Turkey, Syria and Iraq

i) Negotiations held between 19-20 January 1993

During the visit of the Prime Minister Mr. Süleyman Demirel between 19-20 January 1993 to Damascus, Syria expressed the opinion that Joint Technical Committee, after 16 meetings, had not met expectations from it and proposed that the issue be taken up at a political level. Thus, an agreement had been reached to start negotiations which would be headed by top level officials from Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries, with a view to reaching a solution. It was also agreed that those negotiations be conducted in coordination with Turkish and Syrian Foreign Ministers.

ii) Meeting of 17-20 May 1993 Between Turkey and Syria

In this framework, a Syrian delegation came to Ankara for negotiations between 17-20 May 1993. No breakthrough was achieved and not even a press release was issued at the end of these negotiations, mainly due to the Syrian efforts to misinterpret the text of the non-binding Draft Articles on "The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses" of the UN International Law Commission, as well as the 1987 Protocol. Furthermore, during the meeting, Turkey proposed that Orontes River should also be included in the negotiations, but Syria refused to discuss this issue. Consequently, it was concluded that the next meeting was to be held between June 21-24, with the participation of Iraq as well.

iii) The Meeting held with Iraq on 21 June 1993

The Iraqi delegation attended, but Syria, without giving any reason, did not participate in this meeting. During the said meeting, the Iraqi delegation has expressed some arbitrary demands. The Iraqi side also reiterated its notion of mathematical division of Euphrates' flow and demanded that the quantity of water released by Turkey be increased to 700 m3/s.

iv) Notes given by Syria and Iraq on the construction of the Birecik Dam.

A Note related to the construction of the Birecik after-bay Dam has been given to the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Damascus on 3 December 1995. In this Note, Syria has alleged that the flow of the Euphrates would be reduced by the abovementioned dam and that the waters of the Euphrates have been polluted by Turkish irrigation activities.

Turkey has answered on 31 December 1995 the Syrian Note and refuted the Syrian allegations.

Iraq has also submitted a Note on 8 January 1996, which is in the same context that of the abovementioned Syrian Note. Turkey has refuted with a Note on 25 January 1996 the allegations contained in the Iraqi Note.

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(1) Rafael Eitan, "Israel's Critical Water Situation", Water and Irrigation Review, April-October 1990, p.8.
John Bulloch, Adel Darwish, "Water Wars, Coming Conflicts in the Middle East", Victor Golanz, London, 1993, p.43.
(2) Rafael Eitan, Ibid, p.9.
(3) George E. Gruen, "International Regional Cooperation: Preconditions and Limits", compiled booklet of the conference entitled "Water As An Element Of Cooperation And Development In The Middle East", Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, April 1994, p.273.
(4) Information obtained from the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works.
(5) Information received from Turkish Ministry of Public Works.
(6) John Bulloch, Adel Darwish, Op. cit., pp.189-190.
(7) Canada, USA, Countries of Northern and Western Europe
(8) The table obtained from the Investigations and Planning Department of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works.
(9) Ali Ihsan Bagis, Ed., "Water as an Element of Cooperation and Development in the Middle East", Hacettepe University and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Ankara, 1994, p.295.
(10) John F. Kolars, "Problems of International River Management: The Case of Euphrates", Middle East Water Forum, Cairo, 7-10 February 1993, p.49.
Thomas Naff and R.C Matson, "Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?", A Westview Replica Edition, London, 1984, p.92.
Ewan W. Anderson, "Water Geopolitics in the Middle East: The Key Countries", Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East: Instrument for Peace and Development, CSIS, Washington D.C., 24 November 1986, p.191.
Peter Beaumont, "The Euphrates River-An International Problem of Water Resources Development.", Environmental Conservation, Vol.5, No.1, The Foundation for Environmental Conservation, 1978, p.42.
(11) John F. Kolars, William A. Mitchell, "The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project, Water: The Middle East Imperative", Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1991, p. 152.
(12) John F. Kolars, William A. Mitchell, Op. Cit., p.152.
(13) Özden Bilen, "Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin",1993, p. 22.
John F. Kolars, William A. Mitchell, Op. Cit., p. 152.
John F.Kolars, "Managing the Impact of Development: The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and the Ecology of the Arabian Gulf - A link in Forging Tri - Riparian Cooperation", the compiled booklet of the conference entitled "Water As An Element Of Cooperation And Development In The Middle East", Hacettepe University and Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, Ankara, April 1994, pp. 131-135.
Elizabeth Picard, "Eau et Sécurité. Dans le Bassin de l'Euphrate", Géopolitique, Automne 1993, N. 43, p. 76.
(14) Natasha Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East", Adelphi Paper, no. 273, 1993, p. 29.
(15) John F. Kolars, "Managing The Impact of Development: The Euphrates and Tigris Divers and The Ecology of the Arabian Gulf-A Link In Forging Tri-riparian Cooperation", The compiled booklet of the conference entitled "Water As An Element Of Cooperation And Development In The Middle East", Hacettepe University and Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, Ankara, April 1994, p. 137.
(16) Pritt J. Vesilind, Senior Writer,"Water: The Middle East's Critical Resource", National Geographic, May 1993, p.50. Nurit Kliot, " Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East", Routledge Press, London, 1994, p.128.

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