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Cyprus
Information Note
Cyprus is an issue involving Turkey's vital national and
strategic interests. A great amount of commitment and sensitivity
is attached to it both on the public and official level.
Our primary consideration with respect to Cyprus, in line
with our contractual obligations as a guarantor power, has
been the preservation of peace and stability on the island
in general and the protection of safety and well-being of
the Turkish Cypriot people in particular.
It is a fact that despite a 36 year long UN involvement
and numerous rounds of negotiations between the two sides,
a settlement in Cyprus has so far not been achievable. As
in other cases, dealing with the Cyprus issue requires realism,
common sense and a consciousness of the past. While the
past should undoubtedly not serve as an impediment to a
settlement, its lessons must be taken into full account,
if a repetition of its mistakes is to be avoided.
The roots of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the
1950's when Greek Cypriot and Greek aspirations to achieve
Enosis (the island's union with Greece) took the form of
a terrorist campaign against the Turkish Cypriots as well
as the British colonial rule. Despite attempts by Greece
to exploit the issue in the UN, the UN General Assembly
did not uphold Greek demands designed to achieve annexation
under the guise of self-determination, but urged negotiations
among the parties concerned. So when Britain gave Cyprus
independence in 1960, a series of sui generis agreements
had to be reached designed to compromise the conflicting
interests of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as well as
Greece and Turkey.
The "state of affairs" created in Cyprus by the
international Treaties of 1960 was one of political and
sovereign equality, and the equal constituent status of
the two peoples. By virtue of these international Treaties,
limited sovereignty had been transferred by the two peoples,
conjointly and in partnership, in order to establish the
1960 bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. Under the 1960 Treaties
of Guarantee and of Alliance, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and Greece became guarantors of the new state of affairs
which aimed at preventing either one of the two constituent
peoples from imposing its political will over the other
as well as establishing a fair balance between the two motherlands,
Turkey and Greece, vis-a-vis Cyprus.
The 1960 Agreements which gave birth to the "Cyprus
Republic" was therefore firmly based on the equality
of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the independence and
the sovereignty of the island. A bi-communal state machinery
was created with the effective participation of both sides
in all organs of the joint state. Annexation and partition
were expressly proscribed. The Greek Cypriots and Greece,
however, regarded the establishment of the partnership Republic
as a temporary set-back in their ultimate aim of uniting
the island with Greece, i.e. Enosis, and attempted to destroy
both the internal and the external balances created by the
1960 state of affairs from the very first day they were
established. The Greek Cypriots resorted to violence in
December 1963 and expelling their Turkish Cypriot partners
from all the government organs by force of arms, usurping
the state machinery. The Turkish Cypriot people refused
to bow to this illegality. Thus, years of unprecedented
cruelty, bloodshed and suffering started for the Turkish
Cypriot people.
During the 1963-1974 period, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots
were murdered by armed Greek Cypriot paramilitaries and
a quarter of the Turkish Cypriot population (some 30.000
people) rendered homeless. Hundreds more were abducted or
subjected to enforced disappearance, never to be seen or
heard of again. Those lucky enough to survive Greek Cypriot
atrocities, withdrew into small enclaves, the total area
of which corresponded to a mere 3% of the territory of Cyprus,
and led a life of refugees, surviving only thanks to Turkish
Red Crescent aid. The entire world merely watched all this
as a passive spectator for a decade. The UN peacekeeping
force sent to the island in 1964 was ineffective and helpless.
Greece acted in violation of its Treaty obligations as a
guarantor power. Britain also remained indifferent to its
obligations under the same status. Turkish Cypriots were
relieved from this ordeal and saved from total extermination
by the legitimate and timely intervention of Turkey undertaken
in accordance with her Treaty rights and obligations in
1974, after the Greeks had made a bloody attempt at the
final takeover of Cyprus by Greece through a coup d'etat
organized by the junta in Athens and its collaborators in
Cyprus.
There can be no greater injustice then trying to portray
the Turkish intervention as "occupation". This
was both a right and an obligation for Turkey, exercised
in restraint after many years of indifference and inaction
by the world community. Otherwise, either the ethnic cleansing
of the Turkish Cypriots would have been completed or they
would have been forced to leave the island for good. Nothing
would have remained of the independence of the island.
As from the disruption of the constitutional order in 1963,
the two peoples have had their own separate democratically
elected administrations. The Greek Cypriot regime, which
usurped the title of the "Republic of Cyprus"
in 1963, passed itself off as the "government of the
Republic of Cyprus" even though in law and in fact
it was no longer the bi-communal partnership Republic established
in 1960 and its illegal writ had never run over the Turkish
Cypriot people . The legitimacy of the 1960 partnership
Republic lay in the joint presence and effective participation
of both sides in all the organs of the state under and by
virtue of the rule of law then established. Neither party
had the right to rule the other, nor could any one of them
have the right to be the government of the other or represent
the Republic in the absence of the full participation of
the other in all the organs of the state. The international
community, however, continued to treat the de facto Greek
Cypriot administration as if it were the continuation of
the Republic of Cyprus. This unjust practice lacking legal
basis continues to date and is in complete disregard of
the international treaties governing Cyprus. It constitutes
the main impediment standing in the way of a negotiated
solution.
It was only after the Turkish intervention that, for the
first time after 1963, Greek Cypriot violence could be brought
to an end and a serious search undertaken for a negotiated
settlement. An agreement for voluntary exchange of populations
was reached between the two sides and implemented by the
UN. Regrouping of the Turkish Cypriots in the north and
the Greek Cypriots in the south of the island and the new
set of circumstances of the 1974 contributed to the flourishing
of democracy in both parts of the island. The two peoples
of Cyprus established their own administration, in their
respective territories, strengthened their democratic structures
and prospered economically. The institutional organization
of the Turkish Cypriot people developed through various
stages and culminated in the setting up of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.
All this experience has shown that the only sure guarantee
for the Turkish Cypriots is to live in their own independent
state with the effective protection of Turkey. On the basis
of this reality, the Turkish Cypriots strived to work-out
a final compromise. They proposed the establishment of a
federation between the two entities.
The Greek Cypriot side resisted such a settlement, never
negotiated sincerely for a federation and frustrated all
attempts for an agreed solution. They continued to pursue
their goal of extending. Greek Cypriot sovereignty over
the entire island and to engineer a return to the pre-1974
conditions. They continued to posture as the government
of the Republic of Cyprus, which had been forcefully turned
into a purely Greek entity since 1963. They continued to
exploit this usurped title against the Turkish Cypriots
in international fora. They pursued the outrageous embargo
designed to isolate and cripple the Turkish Cypriots. They
did not accept the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots,
the required bases for a federal solution.
The Greek Cypriot leadership demonstrated a continuous
intransigence rejecting numerous UN proposals envisaging
a federal settlement. Brushing the repeated warnings of
the Turkish Cypriots aside, the Greek Cypriot side with
a consistently intransigent attitude, rejected the 1985-86
Draft Framework Agreement, the UN-sponsored Set of Ideas
of 1992 as well as the package of Confidence Building Measures
of 1994 and many others. This intransigence should demonstrate
to all concerned that the Greek Cypriot side is not interested
in a negotiated settlement but is out to destroy the very
parameters which had been established through the process
of negotiations.
With its unilateral and unlawful application for EU membership
in 1990, the Greek Cypriot side added a new and crucial
dimension to its efforts to frustrate the negotiating process
and do away with the parameters which had been developed
through hard work over the years. The Greek Cypriot side
never concealed that it was using EU membership as a ploy
for doing away with the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriot
people and for destroying the balance between Turkey and
Greece over Cyprus in favour of Greece. The unilateral and
unlawful application of the Greek Cypriot regime for EU
membership is, void ab initio and cannot be binding on the
Turkish Cypriot people or on Cyprus as a whole. The Greek
Cypriot administration has no lawful authority or right
under the 1960 Treaties to make such an application on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot people or the whole of Cyprus. Consequently,
the EU should not have processed it as if it were a valid
application.
The EU decision to start accession talks with the Greek
Cypriots under the name of Cyprus made a federal settlement
unfeasible. Basic parameters such as political equality
and bizonality were rendered meaningless given the EU membership
perspective. The EU approach ignored the basic provisions
of the 1960 Treaties that do not allow the membership of
Cyprus in any political or economic union which excludes
either Turkey or Greece. Otherwise, Turkish Cypriots would
be left without the security provided by Turkey and the
external balance established by the 1960 agreements between
the two motherlands over Cyprus would be disrupted.
It is obvious that as long as the Greek Cypriot side is
unjustly treated as the government of the whole island,
it will not adopt a flexible, realistic approach to the
Cyprus issue. On the other hand, the decades-old approach
adopted by the international community of having negotiations
at the level of "the two communities", in the
belief that the question of equal status would come about
as the final outcome, has failed to produce results. Because
the Greek Cypriot leadership, encouraged by the diplomatic
and economic benefits of political recognition, lacking
any incentive to share power with the Turkish Cypriot side
on the basis of political equality, has shown no will to
compromise.
It has, therefore, become imperative that a new approach
and parameters which reflect the existing realities on the
island are determined in order to open the way for reconciliation.
The fact that there are two distinct peoples and two separate
independent states in Cyprus is an indisputable reality.
It is for this reason that any future negotiations should
take place, not as hitherto between the "two communities",
but between the two sovereign states in Cyprus.
The Turkish Cypriot side, with the aim of paving the way
for a settlement based on the realities in Cyprus, took
an important initiative on 31 August 1998 and made a proposal
envisaging the establishment of a Confederation in Cyprus.
The proposal, in essence, updates the 1960 state of affairs
pertaining to Cyprus by preserving the internal balance
in and the external balance over Cyprus. These are the main
elements for peace in the island and in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The proposal reflects realism and vision in that it represents
a common future based on full equality, symmetry and unity.
This proposal is also consistent with the spirit and underlying
philosophy of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions,
in that:
- It calls for a just and lasting settlement,
- It provides for a freely negotiated and mutually acceptable
solution,
- It preserves togetherness and integrity of the island,
- It preserves and confirms the internal and external
balances upon which the 1960 system and treaties were
based,
- It eliminates partition or division,
- It addresses the EU accession issue.
In short, the confederation proposal constitutes an important
step forward and presents a genuine opportunity to resolve
the long-standing Cyprus dispute once and for all.
Despite the constructive approach of the Turkish Cypriot
side, Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, without
giving it serious consideration, turned down the proposal
in haste. Consequently, by rejecting the confederation proposal,
the Greek Cypriot side, has once again demonstrated that
it prefers going its own way instead of establishing a new
partnership structure which safeguards full equality and
symmetry between the two peoples of the island as well as
the historical balance between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus,
as envisaged by international Agreements.
At this stage, what should be done in Cyprus is to help
create the basis required for result-oriented negotiations.
The two sides in the island have no institutional links
since 1963. They are living under their own respective states
and governing themselves separately. These two states should
be able to resolve their differences through their own free
will. They should arrive at an agreement over the core issues
such as property, territory and security. They themselves
should decide how they wish to live in the future. Attempts
to impose settlement models from outside would only bring
grave risks. Enforced co-habitation of the two peoples by
way of formulas which do not respond to the realities of
the island and thereby risking the re-emergence of ethnic
strife and violence cannot be labeled as a good solution.
The tragedies in the Balkans have thought us to be absolutely
cautious in addressing ethnic conflicts.
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