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Background Note on Aegean Dispute
The Aegean Status Quo
Turkey and Greece being the two littoral states have legitimate
rights and interests in the Aegean Sea. These involve their
security, economy and other traditional rights recognized
by international law.
Turkish-Greek differences over the Aegean are related to
the Aegean status quo established by the 1923 Lausanne Peace
Treaty. The Lausanne Treaty established a political balance
between Greece and Turkey by harmonizing the vital interests
of both countries including those in the Aegean.
Turkey fully respects the provisions of Lausanne and in
return expects Greece to act in the same manner. It is true
that in 1923, the continental shelf concept was not foreseen.
Nevertheless, the inherent balance of the Lausanne Treaty
in the Aegean is a guideline in all respects, including
the continental shelf. The basic thinking of the Lausanne
Treaty is, to grant to coastal States limited areas of maritime
jurisdiction and leave the remaining parts of the Aegean
to the common benefit of Turkey and Greece. It is clear
that if one of the littoral States unilaterally extends
its jurisdiction in the Aegean and deprives the other coastal
State from exercising its existing rights, it is no longer
possible to speak of the Lausanne balance in the Aegean.
Consequently,the bilateral Turco-Greek relationship in
the Aegean has to be based on the following principles:
- The Aegean is a common sea between Turkey and Greece.
- The freedoms of the high seas and the air space above
it, which at present both coastal States as well as third
countries enjoy, should not be impaired.
- Any acquisition of new maritime areas should be based
on mutual consent and should be fair and equitable.
The
fundamental source of tension between Turkey and Greece
is the Greek perception to regard the entire Aegean as a
Greek sea in total disregard of Turkey's rights and interests
as one of the coastal states.
Turkish policy is based on respect for the status quo whereas
Greece appears determined to alter it in its favor.
The threat of extending Greek territorial waters beyond
their present width of 6 miles ( Greece extended her territorial
waters from 3 miles to 6 miles in 1936,Turkey followed suit
in 1964),the remilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands
placed under demilitarized status by virtue of the very
agreements ceding them to Greece, a 10 mile "national
air space" over territorial waters of 6, abuse of the
FIR responsibility as if it confers sovereignty (request
of flight plans from state aircraft and allegations of "violations
of" Athens FIR) can be counted among these efforts
which are the real underlying causes of the Turco-Greek
conflict.
The Continental Shelf
The Aegean continental shelf constitutes a dispute between
Turkey and Greece in the absence of a delimitation agreement
affected between the two countries.
The Continental Shelf dispute is but one essential element
among the outstanding differences. It has a bearing on the
overall equilibrium of rights and interests in the Aegean.
The dispute concerns the areas of continental shelf to be
attributed to Turkey and Greece beyond the 6 mile territorial
sea in the Aegean.
Turkey stands ready to engage in a dialogue with Greece
with a view to finding an equitable settlement of the issue
that will be to the best interest of the two countries.
The issue of the Continental Shelf has in the past led
to tensions between Turkey and Greece. Greece has made recourse
to the UN Security Council and the International Court of
Justice with the below results:
The UN Security Council in its Resolution 395, adopted
in 25 August 1976, called upon Turkey and Greece to do everything
in their power to reduce tensions in the Aegean and asked
them to resume direct negotiations over their differences
and appealed to them to ensure that these negotiations result
in mutually acceptable solutions.
The International Court of Justice in its ruling on 11
September 1976, determined the Aegean continental shelf
beyond the territorial waters of the two littoral states
as "areas in dispute" with respect to which both
Turkey and Greece claim rights of exploration and exploitation.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice, in a decision
taken in 1982, stated that "delimitation is to be effected
by agreement in accordance with equitable principles and
taking into account all relevant circumstances."
Subsequent to the International Court of Justice ruling
and the Security Council Resolution, Turkey and Greece signed
the 1976 Bern Agreement.
Under the terms of this Agreement, the two governments
have, inter alia, assumed the obligation to refrain from
any initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental
shelf. This specific obligation was observed by both countries
over several years and thus it was possible to avert the
dispute concerning the Aegean continental shelf from escalating
into tensions and confrontations.
However Greece, who terminated the negotiating process
with Turkey in 1981, started seismic and related activities
and planned drilling operations in the disputed areas of
the Aegean continental shelf in 1981.These activities which
were open violations of the Bern Agreement have formed the
main cause of the March 1987 crisis between Turkey and Greece.
This crisis over drilling beyond territorial waters, was
in fact the culmination of unilateral actions perpetrated
by Greece as regards the Aegean. The crisis was averted
and the "Davos Process", leading to meetings between
Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers was initiated. The
process however yielded no tangible results on the major
issues, due mainly to Greek insistence that the Agenda of
the negotiations could contain no reference to the Aegean
issues.
The Territorial Waters
Another vital element of the delicate balance of rights
and interests in the Aegean sea is the breadth of the territorial
waters.
Under the present 6 mile limit,Greek territorial sea comprises
approximately 43.5 percent of the Aegan sea. For Turkey
the same percentage is 7.5 percent. The remaining 49 percent
is high seas.
It is evident that the extension by Greece of her territorial
waters beyond the present 6 miles in the Aegean, would have
most inequitable implications and would, therefore, constitute
an abuse of right.
If
the breadth of Greek territorial waters is extended to 12
miles due to the existence of the islands, Greece would
acquire approximatively 71.5 percent of the Aegean sea,
while Turkey's share would increase to only 8.8 percent.
The Aegean high seas would diminish to 19.7 percent.
The impact of such a Greek extension of its territorial
waters would be to deprive Turkey, one of the two coastal
states of the Aegean, from her basic right of access to
high seas from her territorial waters,the economic benefits
derived from the Aegean,scientific research,etc.
Any increase beyond 6 miles is totally unacceptable to
Turkey.
The Air Space
Another issue is the problem of Aegean air space.
Half of the Aegean airspace is international airspace.
The two littoral states, Greece and Turkey, have freely
used this area under the provisions and procedures of international
law.
International airspace over the high seas is not under
the sovereignty of any nation. According to international
law, the breadth of national airspace has to correspond
to the breadth of territorial sea. This is clearly reflected
in Articles 1 and 2 the Chicago Convention of 1944 on civil
aviation.
The core of the conflict on the Aegean airspace is the
persistent abuse of "Flight Information Region"
responsibility by Greece as if this responsibility entails
sovereign rights.
The FIR arrangement on the Aegean Airspace devised in 1952
within the framework of ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Organization), is a technical responsibility. Greece, however,
is using it to further its claims of de facto sovereignty
over the Aegean airspace by demanding flight plans from
Turkish state aircraft and allegations of "infringements
of the Athens FIR".
Besides the abuse of its FIR responsibility, Greece claims
a 10 nautical mile national airspace over territorial waters
of 6 nautical miles. This arbitrary claim is a Greek attempt
to reduce the international airspace of the Aegean by 50
percent.
The Demilitarized Status of the Eastern
Aegean Islands
One of the basic elements of the political balance established
by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty in the Aegean is the status
of the Eastern Aegean islands.
Due to the security requirements of Turkey, the demilitarized
status of the Eastern Aegean islands has been an essential
element of the Aegean status quo ever since they were placed
under Greek sovereignty.
- The Athens Decision of l9l4 by the Six Powers stipulated
a demilitarized status for the islands then being turned
over to Greece.
- Articles l2 and Article l3 of the l923 Lausanne Peace
Treaty and Article 4 of its annexed Convention confirmed
this status. The Convention specifically provided that
the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, situated at the
entrance of the Çanakkale Straits (Dardanelles),
be demilitarized on an even stricter basis, thus emphasizing
their vital importance for the security of the Straits.
- The l936 Montreux Convention, which established the
regime of the Turkish Straits, did not bring any change
to the status of the islands.
- The l947 Treaty of Paris turned over the islands, commonly
referred to as the "Dodecanese", to Greece.
This Treaty also sought to reconcile Greek sovereignty
over these islands with the security of Turkey by stipulating
in Article l4 that "these islands shall be and shall
remain demilitarized".
However, Greece has been violating the demilitarized status
of the islands in contravention of her contractual obligations
since the 1960's and has admitted a military presence on
some of these Islands since the 1970's.
Turkey formally raised the issue of the illegal military
activities on the islands as early as mid- 60's and protested
these violations of Greek obligation to keep the islands
demilitarized.
Contrary to the status of Eastern Aegean islands, the Turkish
territories including the Aegean Region is not under such
a demilitarized status.
The Aegean army is basically a training army. This army
has been established in Turkey on legal ground and has a
defencive character.
On the other hand, the recent deployment of EXOCET guided
missile batteries which are offensive weapons on islands
under demilitarized status is a further example of blatant
violation of existing international agreements.
The Conflicting Claims over the Small Islets
and Rocks in the Aegean
and the Kardak Crisis
There are numerous small islets and rocks in the Aegean
ownership of which is not determined by international treaties.
Most of those features can not sustain human habitation
and have no economic life of their own. Greece has attempted
to change their status by opening some of those geographical
features to artificial settlement. To this end, Greece has
enacted laws and regulations that have no bearing from the
point of international law. Turkey regards this new Greek
policy as another attempt to establish "fait accomplis"
with a view to close-off the Aegean Sea as a Greek lake.
The recent crisis over the Kardak rocks has erupted by
coincidence in such an atmosphere when Greece was making
anouncements for recruitement of potential settlers from
all over the world to some of these small islets and rocks.
It is obvious that such a recruitment and settlement effort
is in total disregard of the environmental concerns and
the fragility of the ecosystems of the small islands and
rocks in the Aegean. In addition, it is yet another proof
of Greece's thirst for territorial expansion beyond areas
ceded to her by the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 and the
Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.
The Kardak rocks lie just 3.8 nautical miles off the Turkish
coast. The title deed of the rocks are registered on the
Karakaya village of Bodrum prefecturate, Mugla province.
For years Turkish fishermen have engaged in fishing activities
on and around these rocks without any hinderance and Turkish
vessels have navigated freely through the waters surrounding
them. The series of events started by pure coincidence with
the running aground of a Turkish bulk carrier named "Figen
Akat" near these rocks on 25 December 1995.
In the following weeks there was no crisis. It all changed
on 20 January 1996, nearly a month later, when the incident
was leaked into the Greek periodical "GRAMMA"
which is known to be close to the Greek Government. This
leak took place only the day after Mr.Simitis was named
to form the new Greek Government. A media campaign was launched
by the Greek press with nationalistic overtones.
Then the Mayor of Kalimnos, a Greek island 5.5 nautical
miles away from the Kardak rocks took upon himself to come
to the rocks on 26 January and raise the Greek flag. Incidentally,
the Greek flag had never been hoisted on the Kardak rocks
before. In spite of this provocative action, the official
Turkish reaction was very moderate. However, some Turkish
journalists, no doubt concerned primarily with the circulation
of their paper, hoisted the Turkish flag over Kardak the
next day. This flag hoisting competition by individuals
could have been considered innocent, had not the Greek side
taken a decision to send troops to the Kardak rocks. This
was an act of aggression or armed hostility against Turkish
sovereignty. In the assessment of the crisis, one should
never lose sight of this illegal Greek deployment on the
Kardak rocks.
The Legal Framework
concerning the Kardak Issue
The Greek side tries to base her sovereignty over the Kardak
rocks and over some other similar islets and rocks on
4 January 1932 and 28 December 1932 Turkish-Italian documents
Her succession of the Italian titles in the Aegean through
the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty.
It is interesting to note that there is no mention of any
"Imia Islet" in these documents. The 4 January
1932 Agreement does not concern the Kardak Rocks. A reference
was made to the Kardak Rocks in the 28 December 1932 Document.
However, legal procedures with regard to the latter were
not completed. Neither was it registered with the League
of Nations.
Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads
as follows; "Every Treaty or International Engagement
entered into hereinafter by any Member of the League shall
be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as
soon as possible be published by it. No such Treaty or International
Engagement shall be binding until so registered." Therefore,
no legally binding document exists in this respect.
That Italy has approached the Turkish Government in 1937
raising the issue of ratification of the 28 December 1932
document is an additional indication against its validity.
This Italian demarche was never responded to and no such
action was ever taken.
The Greek proposal submitted during the negotiations of
the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty to make a reference to the 1932
two documents was not accepted, and no such reference was
included in the text of the Treaty.
The fact that Greece has approached the Turkish Government
in 1950 and yet again in 1953 proposing talks with a view
to exchanging letters between the two Governments ascertaining
the validity of the above-mentioned two documents between
Turkey and Greece shows that Greece also had doubts as to
their validity.
The only document that may be referred to regarding the
sovereignty of Dodecanese islands, as already been pointed
out, is the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. This Treaty in its
Article 14 enumerates those islands to be transfered to
Greek sovereignty one by one. Kardak, is not mentioned among
these. The Kardak formations are not "islets"
but two rocks. They lie 5.5 miles away from the nearest
Dodecanese island. Therefore they do not fit into the definition
of "adjacent islets" as stipulated by the Article
14 of the said Treaty.
In addition this Article also envisages a demilitarized
statues for the Dodecanese Islands. Greece has been blatantly
violating this demilitarized status since the mid 1960's.
The treaty has established a direct link between sovereignty
of Dodecanese islans that are so close to the Turkish mainland
and their demilitarized status, taking into consideration
the security requirements of Turkey. A similar arrangement
has been also stipulated by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty
concerning the North Eastern Aegean islands. Their demilitarized
status is also being violated by Greece. This issue is one
of the main disputes between Greece and Turkey. For ease
of reference the text of the Article 14 of the 1947 Paris
Peace Treaty is quoted hereafter.
" 1-Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty
the Dodacanese Islands indicated hereafter, namley Stampalia
(Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto,
Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Niyros), Calimnos
(Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi),
Cos (Kos) and Castellorizo, as well as the adjacent islets.
2-These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarized.
"
An Initiative for Peace
An eventual settlement on the Aegean issues will only be
viable and lasting if it is built on the fundemental rights
and legitimate interests of both countries. The way forward
for such an outcome is discussions on differences to be
carried out on the basis of mutual respect and with a willingness
to reach a compromise. Therefore, Turkey's basic line has
been that the meaningful and result oriented negotiations
to be held between Turkey and Greece should be the only
way for a settlement of the Aegean issues. After the recent
crises which had proved once again the escalatory nature
of the Turkish-Greek relations in the Aegean, Turkey has
adopted a more flexible approach for a solution.
Within this context, on 24 March 1996, the Turkish Government
launched an all-encompassing new initiative concerning Turkish-Greek
relations. This new initiative has four basic and distinct
dimentions:
- It does not exclude any mechanism for a peaceful solution
for the existing problems in the Aegean. It foresees a
comprehensive and peaceful resolution process.
- It proposes a political framework to this end. This
can be achieved in the form of a Political Document or
Declaration to be finalized by the two countries or through
an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation.
- It also puts forward a security framework to be realized
by swift agreement between the two countries on a comprehensive
set of Confidence Building Measures related to military
activities.
- Finally, this initiative lays the ground for a code
of conduct to be abided by the two sides, so that both
Turkey and Greece avoid unilateral steps and actions that
could increase tension, once the process of peaceful settlement
is under way.
Turkey harbours no intention towards altering the status
quo in the Aegean through unilateral steps and de facto
actions. She does however expect Greece to undertake the
same commitment.
The new intiative as put forward by the Turkish Prime Minister,
reflects a long terms approach vis-à-vis Turkish-Greek
relations.
Turkey has always given priority to dialogue to be carried
out by the two countries for a possible peaceful solution
to the existing problems. However, with this new initiative
Turkey, while pointing out to the fact that dialogue is
essential between the two countries, states that she does
not rule out from the outset any other peaceful method based
on mutual acceptance.
Turkey has no prejudices in this respect. She is prepared
to discuss with goodwill appropriate third party methods
of settlement. The form, conditions and legal requirements
of such methods can be taken up in detail in the course
of talks.
We sincerely hope that Greece will stand up to her responsibilities
and not lose this historic opportunity. Even though the
first reactions on the part of the Greek media is negative,
we hope common sense will prevail in Athens and the Greek
leaders will not shrink away from their responsibilities.
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